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The study of legal transplants provides a vital critical supplement
to mainstream theories about legal change. Legal transplants are
not exceptional or isolated occurrences, despite the economic, social,
political and cultural barriers that separate the world’s legal systems.
This Article goes beyond traditional approaches to the study of
transplants by substituting the figurative language of transplants
with explicit theory about how legal change is produced. It first
provides a brief account of what the literature on legal transplants
has achieved so far in terms of "macro" explanations of legal change
currently available. It then argues that legal transplants as social
acts performed by individuals call for a study of the "micro" level of
engagement with legal change by individuals. The key notion that is
advanced to explore this dimension is the notion of mediated action,
which denotes action that is performed by individuals making use of
features of the environment as tools to interact in a specific setting. The
notion of mediated action was first introduced in cultural-historical
psychological investigations of the social formation of the mind. As
social acts, legal transplants represent instances of mediated action.
The last part of this Article highlights how legal transplants raise
questions of justice and discusses briefly how the new approach to the
study of transplants advocated here relates to them.
* The author wishes to thank Joshua Getzler, Ron Harris, Nir Kedar, Roy Kreitner,
Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, and all the participants at the conference on Histories
of Legal Transplantations for their very helpful observations and comments. The
usual disclaimer applies.
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INTRODUCTION
Like every other discipline, legal history is becoming more and more
cosmopolitan nowadays. This turn towards the study of the historical
relationships among the world’s legal systems is supported by comparative
law studies. The ever-growing literature on legal transplants is a resource for
legal historians interested in legal change with reference to the transnational
dimensions of the law. Legal historians who have not taken a strong interest
in comparative law may nonetheless still ask what the study of legal
transplants has to offer.
A first answer to the question could simply be that legal change under
the influence of exogenous factors deserves attention in its own right. It is
neither an exceptional nor a rare phenomenon, despite all assertions to the
contrary. Even the occasional study exploring a specific legal transplant has
its merit, to the extent that it casts light on how external factors contribute
to the making of local law. Legal transplants are surely of interest to
those who are interested in the study of relations of power, such as those
arising through colonization (and the fate of transplants tells us much about
the postcolonial landscape). By now, it should be clear that this field of
study encompasses more than just the possibility of developing occasional
descriptions of "transplants" that have occurred in the past, or are happening
today. Each case is an invitation to explore what lies behind the metaphor of
"transplants." The crucial question for historical and comparative research
today therefore concerns what the student of "legal transplants" can turn up
once the figurative language of transplants is substituted with explicit theory
about how legal change occurs. In other words, once we know, following
Tushnet (who himself follows Le´vi-Strauss), that bricolage occurs in the
law as well and that the bricoleurs have been at work here and there,1 what
other lessons can one learn by studying legal transplants?
My argument is that the study of legal transplants may be helpful to
developing more interesting models of how the law changes than those
1 Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE
L.J. 1225, 1229 (1999): "Contemporary references to comparative constitutional
materials may be a form of bricolage. Functionalists and expressivists worry about
whether appropriating selected portions of other constitutional traditions is sensible,
or whether the appropriation will ‘work’ in some sense. The bricoleur does not have
these concerns about maintaining proper borders among systems." On this point, the
author refers the reader to CLAUDE LE´ VI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 16-17 (John
Weightman & Doreen Weightman trans., 1966).
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currently available from a mainstream point of view. I would also argue that
the study of this subject broadens our understanding of crucial aspects of
the law, including those that raise questions of justice. In advancing these
general propositions, I am addressing points that have already been covered
by others, to whom I am obviously indebted. But previous contributions
on the topic have not touched upon some aspects of it that still need to be
addressed.
To tackle the questions raised above, I will first provide a brief account
of what the literature on legal transplants has achieved so far.2 I will then
show why further progress in the field requires the development of a clearer
picture of what prompts individual action leading to a transplant. In that sense,
what I propose to add to the "macro" explanations of legal change currently
available is an analysis of the "micro" level of individual action which is
implicated in the transplant. To be sure, I would be the last one to deny that
macro approaches framed in terms of institutional action advance powerful
explanations of transplants as means of change, and I do not believe that
minimalism is a virtue. Yet a closer look at what happens at the micro level of
individual interactions can be instructive too. If there is to be a micro history
of transplants, let there be a theory of it as well.3
This "micro" dimension relating to the interface between thought
formation and social action is best approached by opening up the inquiry
to the contributions of other disciplines. In that sense, this is an Article
on the frontiers of legal knowledge, i.e., on the porous boundaries of
legal knowledge and on the shortcomings of our current understanding of
how legal change unfolds. Lastly, the study of legal transplants from this
perspective raises questions of justice too. When the framework of a legal
transplant undermines legality as a dialogic exercise, in which all have the
right to participate on an equal footing, justice is called into question. Some
of the most burning questions of justice in the contemporary world are
inscribed in this scenario. The last part of this Article therefore highlights
how legal transplants raise questions of justice and discusses briefly how
the micro approach advocated here relates to them.
2 For further reflections: Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of
Transplants and Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 441
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2007).
3 At least if law is to be understood not as a self-contained system, but as an aspect of
social life: William J. Novak, Law, Capitalism, and the Liberal State: The Historical
Sociology of James Willard Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 97 (2000).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LITERATURE
ON LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: A PERIODIZATION
A periodization of the literature on legal transplants should start with those
contributions that were produced avant la lettre, before legal transplants
became a topic in their own right. Historically, the reception of Roman
law in medieval Europe raised the problem — explicitly addressed
by Montesquieu4 — of the fit between local conditions and imported law.
Similarly, the expansion of the common law during the colonial period, the
diffusion of Islamic law in many countries, and the reception of Western codes
and constitutional models across the world have hardly gone unnoticed in the
last two hundred years. The literature on legal transplants avant la lettre
includes a first layer of contributions, which investigate these or similar
phenomena. The reception of foreign laws, or the outright imposition
of foreign laws through colonization or conquest, have always generated
reflections on the tension between the local and the foreign elements of the
law.
The literature that puts an emphasis on legal transplants as a major factor
of change in comparative and legal history circles is not made up of this
first layer of works, however. It consists instead of essays that, in the
last forty years, reacted to functionalist-positivist views of the law, which
consider the law as a constellation of norms produced by ruling powers in
response to society’s needs, backed up by the application of force. Research
on legal transplants has been used to challenge this account of the law by
accumulating evidence to show how much law is borrowed or transplanted,
instead of being created through local innovations developed on the basis
of local conditions.5 For example, the fact that the Japanese civil code bears a
4 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. I,
ch. 3, at 7 (Thomas Nugent trans., 4th ed. 1766). The influence of Montesquieu
on Savigny is obvious. Both thought that the law is organically related to the
constitution of society. On Montesquieu’s stance, see Robert Launay, Montesquieu:
The Specter of Despotism and the Origins of Comparative Law, in RETHINKING THE
MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 22 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001); and for his influence
on Savigny: PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION 56 passim (1980).
5 The contribution by ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (1974) is the first of this kind to have gained immediate
resonance, in part because it attracted criticism from many quarters. The argument
presented in this slim volume was further advanced in several other publications by
the same author, which cannot be cited here in full. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
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close resemblance to the German civil code, with occasional concessions to the
Frenchcivil code, cannotbeexplainedbypositinga fundamental commonality
in terms of socioeconomic and cultural factors between France, Germany and
Japan. It is to be explained otherwise, i.e., by the Japanese government’s
choice to rely on these Western models to change the law of Japan. In this
special sense only, borrowed law relates to the local conditions, which in truth
are often the conditions of an imagined future.6
The literature on transplants received widespread attention among
comparativists because it showed that legal systems can accommodate
a plurality of models, though most transplants probably still occur across
legal systems that already have much in common. Though only some legal
systems are currently classified as "mixed," many more exhibit features
revealing that borrowing or transplantation are regular occurrences, even
across boundaries that would not have seemed to be so permeable. This
finding casts serious doubts on the utility of the established approach to
comparative law with its heavy reliance on the classification of legal systems
into legal families. The dynamic approach to comparative law supported
by the study of legal transplants thus stands in stark contrast to the static
picture of legal families portrayed by classics like Rene´ David’s Major
Legal Systems in the World.7
In more recent years, the literature on legal transplants has commanded
growing attention for different reasons, which are not purely academic.
If the law can be transplanted, policymaking by governing powers and
international institutions can achieve objectives that require legal reform
through legal transplants. The question whether law can be transferred from
one place to another turns out to be a question of the highest importance,
whether these actors are interested in political reform, economic growth,
ORIGINS AND LEGAL CHANGE (1991); ALAN WATSON, COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW,
REALITY AND SOCIETY (2007). There is now a vast bibliography on legal transplants
that explores the topic from different perspectives. For a critical perspective on the
topic, see, for example, Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal
Thought, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (David M. Trubek &
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); DIEGO EDUARDO LO´ PEZ MEDINA, TEORI´A IMPURA DEL
DERECHO (2004); Pier Giuseppe Monateri, The ‘Weak Law’: Contaminations and
Legal Cultures (Borrowing of Legal and Political Forms), 13 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 575 (2003).
6 David Nelken, Comparatists and Transferability, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES
446, 457 passim (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003).
7 RENE´ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY
(1978). Cf. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative
Law (pts. 1 & 2), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 343 (1991).
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social progress, or less beneficial ends. Unsurprisingly, institutions like the
World Bank now take an interest in the literature on legal transplants and
the topic features regularly in the study of economic growth and political
change, as every student of law and development knows.8
Once the topic was established as a new academic subject, the literature
on legal transplants entered a third stage. This is marked by the critical
discussion of the thesis arguing that legal transplants are not isolated
occurrences, but regular factors of change, notwithstanding the economic,
social, political and cultural barriers that separate the world’s legal systems.
It is hardly surprising that comparative law studies on transplants soon
became the target of criticism by authors who supported the study of law
in functional terms.9 They were meant to provoke this reaction. As a matter
of fact, the second layer of research on transplants just mentioned represented
a clean break with the orthodoxy which has held, at least since the time of
Montesquieu, that law and society are bound up together. Yet the finding that
law is mobile has also been criticized from a different standpoint, on the basis
of the assumption that law as a social construct cannot remain the same, once
it is dislocated.10 On this account, the "transplant" cannot survive the change
of context. In the new context, the original meaning of what is transplanted
is, of necessity, lost. From this point of view, legal transplants are held to
be impossible. This strong criticism — which is based on hermeneutics —
is not the last word on the subject, however. Its rejection of any mechanical
view of the transplantation process opened up the field to more nuanced
contributions. These aimed to show how transplants always involve a degree
of cultural adaptation, a "domestication" that is the necessary counterpart of
8 On these issues: THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 5;
Symposium, Diffusion of Law in the 21st Century: Interaction and Influence, 47
HARV. INT’L L.J. 489 passim (2006) (contributions by Pierre Legrand, William
Twining, David A. Westbrook); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL
BUSINESS REGULATION (2000); see also CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR,
LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008). Needless to say,
globalization depends upon this dynamic: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES:
GLOBALISATION AND POWER DISPARITIES (Michael Likosky ed., 2002).
9 See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Law as Lag: Inertia as a Social Theory of Law, 80
MICH. L. REV. 785 (1982) (reviewing ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE
(1977)).
10 See Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants,’ 4 MAASTRICHT J.
EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997); Pierre Legrand, The Same and the Different, in
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 6, at 240.
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the transplantation — whether it concerns the law, or other social or cultural
artifacts that travel across space.11
Meanwhile, anthropological and sociological studies have highlighted the
complex constitution of "culture" and "society," i.e., those entities which
feature so prominently in any discourse about the social constitution of the
law. Far from being a homogeneous whole, culture is itself the expression of
tensions and compromises among different possible cultural constellations.12
Comparative law itself has established that the undifferentiated notion of
"law" is quite unhelpful in this type of inquiry. The various components of
legal systems — the different formants in Sacco’s terminology — may fall
under the effects of different influences.13 Hence the necessity to distinguish
which features of legal systems come into consideration in the analysis
of transplants. A concrete example of this type of analysis is Nir Kedar’s
recent study of the Israeli legal system as a mixed jurisdiction in a double
sense,14 not only because it exhibits the mixing of Anglo-American and
Romano-Germanic legal institutions, but also because it shows the working
of institutions that originated in Anglo-American law within the framework
of a European political culture. We have to turn to this culture to understand
why the codification of the Israeli civil law is considered to be a key factor in
the development of the Israeli legal system.15
That is where we stand today with regard to the methodological issues
discussed by the literature on legal transplants. Considering this picture
from a critical point of view, it is only fair to say that all the approaches
to legal transplants so far considered have essentially focused on law as a
cultural or social object with institutional dimensions. I fully agree with this
approach, insofar it includes in the constitution of law all those habits that
have a collective dimension and normative force. But I would also argue that
11 See, e.g., ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES (David Nelken & Johannes Fest eds., 2001).
12 See now Annelise Riles, Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 2, at 775; Roger Cotterell,
Comparative Law and Legal Culture, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
LAW, supra note 2, at 709; FREDRIK BARTH, ETHNIC GROUPS & BOUNDARIES (1969).
13 Sacco, supra note 7: Sacco has been one of the pioneers of the research on legal
transplants among comparativists.
14 Nir Kedar, Law, Culture and Civil Codification in a Mixed Legal System, 17 CAN.
J.L. & SOC’Y 177 (2007).
15 Alfredo Mordechai Rabello & Pablo Lerner, The Project of The Israeli Civil Code:
The Dilemma of Enacting a Code in a Mixed Jurisdiction, in LIBER AMICORUM
GUIDO ALPA: PRIVATE LAW BEYOND THE NATIONAL SYSTEMS 773 (Mads Andenas
et al. eds., 2007).
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the literature on legal transplants is far less informative on how individual
agency works to produce legal change.
Legal transplants as social acts performed by individuals deserve a second
look.16 They deserve a second look even when the intuitive explanation for
the transplant — its alleged "functionality" — is wholly plausible.17 In this
Article, therefore, I intend to unearth what lies beyond the macro level of "the
law," to highlight the micro dimensions of individual interactions which are
implicated in the transplant. An analysis of the features of the process whereby
an individual is prompted to take action leading to a transplant is as important
asa reflectionon the intrinsicqualityof the lawthat is at stake,or thefitbetween
that law and the local context, as Michael Crystal and Ron Harris show in their
contribution on the transplantation of British company law in post-Ottoman
Palestine.18 Furthermore, though the trajectories of the lives of the protagonists
of transplants remains a fascinating subject, the shift advocated here clearly
goes beyond the biographical dimensions related to transplants, which have
so often been investigated in the study of legal transplants.
16 In the same vein, see Assaf Likhovski, Argonauts of the Eastern Mediterranean:
Legal Transplants and Signaling, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 619 (2009).
17 Since the nineteenth century at least, this is the standard answer to the question
why transplants (not imposed by violence) occur: RUDOLF VON JHERING, GEIST
DES RO¨ MISCHEN RECHTS AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUFEN SEINER ENTWICKLUNG
pt. I, at 8 (B. Schwabe 9th ed. 1955), cited in KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KO¨ TZ,
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 17 (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998): "The
reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of nationality, but of usefulness
and need. No one bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has one as good or
better at home, but only a fool would refuse quinine just because it didn’t grow in
his back garden." See also Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay
in Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1994), and on
the same point, in different perspective: Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A
Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
383 (2002).
18 Ron Harris & Michael Crystal, Some Reflections on the Transplantation of British
Company Law in Post-Ottoman Palestine, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 561 (2009).
This is also a point made at the macro level in the debate over the so-called "legal
origins hypothesis": Cf. Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality,
and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003).
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II. BUT WHAT IS A TRANSPLANT?
MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ABOUT TRANSPLANTS
AND HOW TO LIVE WITH THEM
Let me introduce the topic by addressing a preliminary point. The
literature on legal transplants abounds with terminological distinctions.19
Their profusion reflects both every scholar’s desire to leave a footprint in the
field and the difficulty of including all the different events that make up the
historical record in a single framework.
By itself, this terminological fragmentation suggests that identifying what
a transplant is can be a tricky matter. For instance, agents of change that had
no intention of borrowing foreign law as such may have carried out what
later commentators would call a transplant. Quite often, the intent of these
agents was simply to make the (local) law evolve in the light of seminal
ideas, or of an enlightening experience, etc. Could they, just like Molie`re’s
Bourgeois gentilhomme, who spoke prose without knowing it, have been
engaged in making transplants without knowing it? On the other hand, some
transplants exist only in the beliefs of a certain community. This paradoxical
possibility arises because the collective memory of a certain group can be at
odds with the historical facts.20 Demonstrating this possibility, Pnina Lahav’s
contribution on the history of the American influence on Israeli legal education
shows that the problem method of legal education in Israel was not an import
from Harvard, as many today think, but was instead an innovation originally
promoted by Professor Joshua Weisman. Hence, this is "an excellent example
of the need to address transplantation carefully and skeptically. Something
that looks like a transplant may, in fact, be homegrown."21
Confronted with these patterns, the question then is: who shall pass
judgment on what is a transplant? I would argue that the possibility of
a plurality of answers to the question remains open. One need not be a
19 For an illustration of some of these distinctions, see Graziadei, supra note 2, at
443-44.
20 The seminal contributions on this point are THE INVENTION OF TRADITION (Eric
Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983); and MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON
COLLECTIVE MEMORY (Lewis A. Coser trans., 1992).
21 Pnina Lahav, American Moment[s]: When, How, and Why Did Israeli Law Faculties
Come to Resemble Elite U.S. Law Schools, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 653, 674
(2009).
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relativist to appreciate that the same historical events can be approached
from different perspectives.22
It is well known that one of the most delicate problems in historiography
is to what extent it is possible to avoid anachronism in dealing with the
past. To what extent, for example, does it make sense to use the concept
of "feudalism," which was coined after the fact, and originally colored
with a pejorative connotation,23 to write the history of pre-modern Europe?
There is no single correct answer to this question. All one can ask for is that
the premises underpinning the research be made explicit. This will help to
understand its limits.
Comparative law tackles similar problems, especially when it deals with
institutions that are unknown in one or more legal systems. How can the
English law of trusts be explained to a French or Italian lawyer who knows
nothing about the distinction between common law and equity? Should
such an explanation illustrate the peculiar learning of equity lawyers, and
if so how? And in which sense does that distinction have an operative
edge in England today? Should we speak of a transplant in the presence
of selective imitation, such as that which occurs when a civil law country
enacts legislation reproducing only some features of trusts as known, for
example, in England?
Any serious comparative law study requires an analysis of the concepts
and categories that have gained currency in the community which is being
studied. But this analysis is carried out in the light of an external point
of view, that of the comparativist. The elaboration of that point of view
usually involves concepts and categories that are at least in part autonomous
from those adopted locally. They may not be known or shared by the
members of the community in question. Comparative law embraced the
functional method in order to develop such concepts and categories.24 Yet
it never set forth systematically, in formal terms, the distinction between all
these various perspectives. Because of the search for objectivity in the law —
in comparative law — the problem of representing the multiplicity of points
22 CARLO GINZBURG, Distance and Perspective: Two Metaphors, in WOODEN EYES
139 (Martin Ryle & Kate Soper trans., 2001).
23 Cf. Amalia Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century
Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively American
Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 423 (2009).
24 Cf. Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 2, at 339; Michele Graziadei, The
Functional Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 6, at 100.
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of view that emerge through the comparative exercise has too often been
belittled.25
The problem in question is, on the other hand, well known to
anthropologists. In anthropology, the pair of neologisms emic/etic refer,
respectively, to distinctions that are meaningful to the members of a certain
community and can be validated only by them (emic), and to extrinsic
concepts or categories adopted by the observers of that community (etic).
These neologisms were introduced into the subject by analogy to the terms
"phonemic" and "phonetic," first used by linguists to denote different levels
of description of the sounds of a language.26
Comparative law studies can benefit from an increased awareness of the
necessity to distinguish between the different perspectives involved in the
study of transplants. All too often those who point to legal transplants as a
means by which legal change is produced are confronted with the reply that
the only real choice here is between rejection and assimilation. This retort
assumes that something foreign cannot really "fit in," unless it is completely
assimilated. Until then, what is borrowed works as an irritant.27 But once
assimilation has been achieved, the foreign element is no longer apparent, it
is gone as a transplant. Before buying this reconstruction of transplants, let’s
examine it critically.
First, since transplants are regular occurrences in the development of the
law, it is difficult to see why they should be considered somewhat artificial, or
exceptional. Second, the time frame adopted to evaluate the consequences of
a specific event is relevant. The passage of time alters the original situation;
over time, nothing remains the same. What is the proper time frame to pass
judgment on whether something foreign really "fits in" the local ambience?
Should we think in terms of months, years, decades, centuries? True, at
the end of a transplantation process it may be necessary — so to speak
— to throw away the ladder that was so helpful to reaching the top.28 The
transplant thus becomes invisible. Nonetheless, to stick to the metaphor, an
outside observer will still notice that the ladder had to have been there in the
first place, whether its users do not have any memory of it, or are unwilling to
mention it, or do not consider it an important element in the context. An entire
community may be unwilling to be open about the foreign origins of cultural
25 Cf. Pierre Legrand, Comparative Legal Studies and the Matter of Authenticity, 1 J.
COMP. L. 365 (2006).
26 EMICS AND ETICS (Thomas N. Headland et al. eds., 1990).
27 On this metaphor: Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or
How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Differences, 61 M.L.R. 11 (1998).
28 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 6.54 (1921).
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elements that are now considered constitutive of the collective identity shared
by the members of that community. This does not mean that something alien
was not there in the first place. It may be impolite to raise the question, and
yet answers to impolite questions can be very instructive indeed.
The increased attention paid in recent years by comparative law
scholarship to the linguistic interactions involved in legal transplants and to
legal translation is, perhaps, also a response to the necessity of developing
a better appreciation of the multiplicity of perspectives involved in legal
transplants. An account of a transplant by the members of the community
that experimented with it does not necessarily correspond to the outsider’s
account of the same historical fact. It is not framed in the same language, to
begin with.29
III. MACRO-MICRO I: LANGUAGE AND TOOLS
It is one thing to notice that legal transplants happen. But to have an inkling
of what goes on when they happen is quite another. It is virtually impossible
to make sense of legal transplants without inquiring what legal change
implies in empirical terms, i.e., in terms of empirical analysis of the social
acts involved in the actuation of transplants by individuals.
From this perspective, mainstream legal analysis is not the best
available framework to understand legal change. I am considering here
the conventional analysis of legal change, which roughly corresponds to a
view of the legal system that often represents the authority of the law by a
model in which norms are imposed from above, through a top-down chain of
command. This model implicitly holds that language is a transparent means
of communication and will only occasionally fail to convey the necessary
information to those who are subject to the law. Under this model, legal
change is essentially a matter of sovereign will and of sovereign power. It is
hardly surprising that, in the history of ideas, as well as in practice, the most
serious challenge to this reconstruction of the legal system has been carried
29 On comparative law, language and legal translation, the studies that are contributing
to the renovation of the field include at least: JEAN-CLAUDE GE´ MAR & NICHOLAS
KASIRER, JURILINGUISTICS: BETWEEN LAW AND LANGUAGE (2005); Pierre Legrand,
Issues in the Translatability of Law, in NATION, LANGUAGE, AND THE ETHICS OF
TRANSLATION 30 (Sandra Bermann & Michael Wood eds., 2005); Bernard Grossfeld,
Comparatists and Languages, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 6, at
154; Rodolfo Sacco, Lingua e Diritto, 2000 ARS INTERPRETANDI 113; and ICHIRO
KITAMURA, PROBLEMS OF THE TRANSLATION OF LAW IN JAPAN (1993).
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out in the name of custom. Customary law works without a sovereign who
is able to express a will and without putting great faith in words. Nor it is
surprising that, in light of the limitations of this monistic model, theories of
law which speak of legal pluralism have attained prominence today.30
The dominant "macro" view of the legal system mentioned above veils
the problems that law, especially transplanted law, poses as a normative
order. Legal change on a grand scale surely can be brought about by
decision-making located in centers of power. Over the centuries, ruling
powers have been able to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt. But when
the focus is on change at the level of individual interactions the historical
record is not self-explanatory, even when the politics and power relations
which drive the process of change are crystal clear.
An account of the production of legal innovation at this level, i.e., at
the level of engagement with legal change by individuals, must unveil
the structure of individual action.31 Individual action is conceived and then
actuated through verbal and nonverbal behavior. Both are constitutive of
the institutional dimensions of the law resulting from the collective effects of
individual actions. In literate societies it is easy to overestimate the importance
of the linguistic formulation of norms, but comparative law (along with legal
sociology) confirms that language itself floats on a sea of implicit knowledge
and understanding. The concept of cryptotype introduced by Sacco among
comparativists stands for these silent dimensions of the law,32 which represent
the classic nine-tenths of the iceberg below the water line.33 At a more general
level, the study of culture shows indeed that language is just one of many tools
that humans employ.34
30 For the present debate over the various conceptions of legal pluralism, see the
contributions collected in E´ TUDIER ET ENSEIGNER LE DROIT 318 passim (Nicholas
Kasirer ed., 2006); and in 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 343 passim (2008).
31 This is also, in my view, the starting point of the radical version of pluralism
advanced by Roderick A. Macdonald, Here, There . . . and Everywhere: Theorizing
Legal Pluralism; Theorizing Jacques Vanderlinden, in E´ TUDIER ET ENSEIGNER LE
DROIT, supra note 30, at 318 passim; and by Jacques Vanderlinden, Return to Legal
Pluralism: Twenty Years Later, 28 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 149
(1989).
32 Cf. Sacco, supra note 7, at 343, 347-48. The author borrowed this notion from
the linguist BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY 70 (1956).
In the same vein: Edward Eberle & Bernhard Grossfeld, Patterns of Order in
Comparative Law: Discovering and Decoding Invisible Powers, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J.
291 (2003).
33 Cf. Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the Navigation
of the Yellow Submarine, 80 TULANE L. REV. 1161 (2006).
34 Imitation not mediated by words is, of course, the way in which cultural innovation
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This insight can be further elaborated by taking into account the results of
research on mediated action, which was first carried out by cultural-historical
psychology in the last century. Mediated action denotes action that is
performed by individuals making use of features of the environment as
tools to interact in a specific setting. The pioneer in this field was the
Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky, who investigated the social formation
of the mind.35 A contemporary of Jean Piaget, with whom he had much
in common, beginning with rejection of the Cartesian mind-body dualism,
Vygotsky underscored the importance of mediated action in the constitution
of human psychology. Cole and Wertsch summarize his theory as follows:
Higher mental functions are, by definition, culturally mediated; they
involve not a "direct" action on the world, but an indirect action, one
that takes a bit of material matter used previously and incorporates it
as an aspect of action. In so far as that matter has itself been shaped
by prior human practice (e.g., it is an artefact), current action benefits
from the mental work that produced the particular form of that matter.36
A graphic illustration of mediated action is provided by the following
experiment. Vygotsky and his collaborators asked a patient with Parkinson’s
disease to walk across the room where they were conducting their research.
The patient did not move; the request produced only an increase of his
tremors. Before repeating the request, they placed pieces of paper on the
floor marking a sequence of steps. When they asked the patient once more to
walk, he crossed the room by treading sequentially on the pieces of papers.
They worked as cues telling him what to do: they made a difference.37
The idea of mediated action is not limited to the hypothesis of action
realized through the instrumentality of material tools. Language features
prominently among the artifacts considered by Vygotsky, along with "various
systems for counting; mnemonic techniques; algebraic symbol systems;
works of art; writing; schemes, diagrams, maps, and mechanical drawings;
all sorts of conventional signs, and so on."38
Vygotsky made it clear that the way the tool is actually used may or may
spreads in the animal world. Cf. Thomas R. Zentall, Imitation: Definitions, Evidence,
and Mechanisms, 9 ANIMAL COGNITION 335 (2006).
35 For an introduction to his thought: THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO VYGOTSKY
(Harry Daniels et al. eds., 2007); PIAGET-VYGOTSKY: THE SOCIAL GENESIS OF
THOUGHT (Anastasia Tryphon & J. Jacques Vone`che eds., 1996).
36 Michael Cole & James V. Wertsch, Beyond the Individual-Social Antinomy in
Discussions of Piaget and Vygotsky, 39 HUM. DEV. 250, 252 (1996).
37 JAMES V. WERTSCH, VYGOTSKY AND THE SOCIAL FORMATION OF MIND 78 (1985).
38 Lev Seme¨novich Vygotsky, The Instrumental Method in Psychology, in THE
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not correspond to its intended use. We can use a broom to feign riding a
horse, though this use is surely not its intended use. This is why his theory
focused on mediated action, rather than on the tool itself, or its intended
use. The blurring of the distinction between the internal and the external
sphere which occurs when tools are used and the human ability to internalize
tools are a central feature of human psychology under this theory. Vygotsky
actually maintained that it is the central tenet of human psychology.
Drawing upon the insight that language is a social tool, the same
approach provides an account of how cultural processes unfold in "sites
of engagement," where discourses turn into action.39 Mediated discourse
analysis rejects the sender-receiver model of communication precisely
because that model ignores the social setting in which actions of all kinds
take place:
[A] text never leads to any unique outcome or action and so a fortiori
an analysis of that text remains at an even greater distance from social
action: No analysis of a text in itself . . . can ever determine whether
a news story might be appropriated to form a portion of an argument
among friends over a coffee, be used as an example in a university
lecture on critical discourse analysis, or that the entire newspaper may
be used to wrap fish in the market.40
As social acts, legal transplants represent instances of mediated action. The
tools employed in carrying out the transplants are constituted by the original
legal materials appropriated to do so. Without those tools, the course of legal
change would have been different, and yet what the transplant achieves is
no mere reproduction of an original form or content.
In this volume, the article by Yoram Shachar on the drafting of the
Israeli Declaration of Independence41 brilliantly illustrates how mediated
action works with respect to legal transplants. The task of preparing a first
CONCEPT OF ACTIVITY IN SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY 134, 137 (James V. Wertsch ed.,
1981).
39 DISCOURSE IN ACTION: INTRODUCING MEDIATED DISCOURSE ANALYSIS (Sigrid
Norris & Rodney H. Jones eds., 2005). In these contexts there is clearly a cultural
control dynamic in place as well, however (see infra Part IV on the role of ideology
in transplants). From a broader perspective one could also address the same topic
from a cultural control perspective, as I intend to do in a future essay.
40 Cf. Ron Scollon & Susan W. Scollon, Fast English, Slow Food, and Intercultural
Exchanges, in IDENTITY, COMMUNITY, DISCOURSE 32, 35 (Giuseppina Cortese &
Anna Duszak eds., 2005).
41 Yoram Shachar, Jefferson Goes East: The American Origins of the Israeli
Declaration of Independence, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 589 (2009).
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draft of the legal document that eventually became the Israeli Declaration
of Independence was first assigned to Mordechai Beham, a minor figure in
the nascent ministry of justice headed by Felix Rosenblueth in Tel Aviv in
1948. Beham was simply unable to draft a declaration of independence from
scratch. He did not know where and how to begin, as he confided to his family,
so he copied. The source of inspiration was found in the rich private library
of Rabbi Harry Davidowitz, just across the street from where Beham’s family
lived. Armed with three pages of English citations, he was eventually able to
produce a first draft of the document in the short time that had been assigned
to him. To be sure, the final version of the Israeli Declaration of Independence
proclaimed by David Ben-Gurion (as well the more advanced draft for which
Rosenblueth took responsibility) cannot be considered Hebrew versions of
Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence:
They were, respectively, Rosenblueth’s and Ben-Gurion’s Declaration
of Independence. And yet, they would not have been what they were
if Mordechai Beham had not set pen to paper like a diligent student
in a private library in Tel-Aviv and written "When in the course of
human history it becomes necessary for one people . . . ."42
IV. MICRO-MACRO II: IDEOLOGY
The analysis of the contexts in which discourse turns into action also shows
the importance of ideologies as a means conducive to the legitimization of
norms, including transplanted norms. Ideologies as forms of action-oriented
beliefs respond to the need to build consensus or resistance to the transplanted
law. They transform power into influence.
The micro perspective on legal transplants advanced here conceives of
ideology in functional terms, as a means of coordinating the actions of
the members of a group, whether dominant or not. It is in the nature of
ideology that its adherents will mostly act in the same way in a similar
situation, show willingness to carry out joint tasks, and contribute to group
cohesion. In that sense, an ideology is essentially an interface between
42 Yoram Shachar, From Divine Providence to the Rock of Israel: Two Declarations
of Independence (June 11, 2008) (draft version of Shachar, supra note 41, delivered
at the Cegla Center conference on Histories of Legal Transplantations, on file with
author). There are countless example of this transformative dynamic, which is
brilliantly illustrated on a larger scale by a recent study: MEDINA, supra note 5.
2009] Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal Knowledge 739
individual practice and collective action.43 As a means of facilitating change,
ideology works more smoothly when it appears to be "neutral" because it
relies on assumptions that are largely unchallenged (such as those associated,
for example, with the ideas of progress, modernization, development). It sells
even better as an expression of paternalistic benevolence (compassionate
conservatism; foreign aid). Ideology has mostly been investigated as a
means of legitimizing domination. To speak of domination as God-given,
natural, inevitable, etc. effectively breaks down psychological resistance to
it by making any alternative seem unreal.44 And yes, lawyers have regularly
engaged in arguing that domination is, under given conditions, the realization
of high ideals of justice.45 Yet ideology is not always linked to a strategy of
domination. Some ideologies support the status quo, others are invoked to
promote reform or revolution. In the present context, ideology is therefore
introduced as a methodological concept which is intended to convey neither
positive nor negative connotations. Prestige is often mentioned as one of the
vehicles of legal transplants.46 But the analysis of prestige as a factor in the
process of legal transplantation falls into the broader domain of the analysis of
ideology, since prestige is inscribed in a set of beliefs about the world, about
status and achievement.
Four articles in this volume directly address various dimensions of
ideology with specific regard to transplants. Christopher Tomlins explains,
inter alia, how the creation of an Anglo-American law of slavery in
the modern age relied on arguments that supported slavery as being
just.47 Jane Dailey shows how the ideology of race superiority in the U.S.
was a pillar of the prohibition against interracial marriages well after World
War II, and how U.S. resistance to international human rights norms on the
ground of sovereignty was related to it.48 Steven Wilf elucidates nineteenth
43 Cf. DISCOURSE AS SOCIAL INTERACTION 25 passim (Teun A. van Dijk ed., 1997);
from a similar perspective, Monateri, supra note 5, notes that comparative law itself
can be considered an ideological project.
44 Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006); J. Berger et al., The Legitimation and Delegitimation
of Power and Prestige Orders, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 379 (1998).
45 See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, Grammaire africaine, in MYTHOLOGIES 137, 139
(1957): "DIEU: forme sublime´e du gouvernement franc¸ais."
46 E.g., Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and
Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (1995).
47 Christopher L. Tomlins, Transplants and Timing: Passages in the Creation of an
Anglo-American Law of Slavery, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389 (2009).
48 Jane Dailey, Race, Marriage, and Sovereignty in the New World Order, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 511 (2009).
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century and early twentieth century legal primitivism and its contribution
to the legitimization of patterns of domination over indigenous peoples.49
He notes that cultural cliche´s — I would say more broadly ideologies —
can become technologies of power in the legal domain.50 Assaf Likhovski’s
history of two Israeli legal cooperation programs which unfolded in the 1950s
and 1960s highlights the complicated history surrounding the development of
a segment of that network of international relations that marks the birth of a
new state.51 As Likhovski notes, credible commitments to systems of belief
may require costly investments that need to be perceived by others to produce
positive responses. Conspicuous consumption — frequently associated with
prestige — is one way to signal willingness to undertake and carry out such
commitments. In the case analyzed by Likhovski, the new State of Israel
invested in the two programs to show its willingness to cooperate with other
countries and advertise its own stability and strength. The programs were
designed to communicate to Israel’s potential Western allies as well as its Arab
enemies the fact that Israel was a part of the civilized world and intended to
enjoy the benefits commonly associated with admission to the exclusive club
of mature democracies, though, as Likhovski notes, considerations regarding
the practical goals of these programs were also important in their making.
Ideologies are not perennial, they rise and fall. Successful ideologies are
in a state of constant evolution. They adapt to changing environments.52 One
of the most fecund exercises in comparative law research is the analysis of the
origin and decline of ideologies, their transformations, their ambiguities, and
above all, their contradictions. From the micro perspective advocated here,
it is certainly true that ideologies tolerate multiple personal affiliations and
subtle variations in personal commitments.
V. DOING JUSTICE IN THE CASE OF TRANSPLANTS: AN OPEN ISSUE
Finally, the study of legal transplants from the perspective advocated here
leads to reflections on issues of justice that transcend the boundaries of
49 Steven Wilf, The Invention of Legal Primitivism, 10 TEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 485
(2009).
50 Id.
51 Likhovski, supra note 16.
52 J.M. BALKIN, CUTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1998) approaches this
theme through the prism of meme theory analysis of cultural evolution in Darwinian
terms.
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a single legal system, confronting justice with the challenge of diversity
among communities and individuals.
Most theories of justice in circulation today begin with the notion of
community and virtually end there. They examine what justice requires
within the boundaries of the community. Whether that community is defined
in political or moral terms, these theories have a hard time with questions
of justice that concern those who do not belong to the community, or live
at its margins. The source of the difficulty is easy to understand. These
theories assume that justice and the recognition of rights are explicitly
or implicitly dependent upon preexisting individual commitments that are
constitutive of the community. The boundaries of the community defined by
those commitments set the yardstick of justice. Those who do not belong
to the community can be dealt with on a different footing. If they are
not treated according to the murderous idea that might makes right, they
nonetheless stand on precarious ground. In other words, if no community
upholds your claims, they may very well fail. This dramatically illustrates
how little "common humanity" by itself can achieve.
In the last few centuries natural law — a major intellectual attempt to
develop an alternative vision of the legal order — has been relegated to the
corner by the ascent of legal positivism and political realism. Furthermore,
natural law has been a poor shield against the abuses carried out in the name
of both philosophies. Among its limitations, there is also its ethnocentric
bias, despite its universalistic claims.
In world history, transplants have been the occasion for reflections on
justice that decry both the limitations of natural law and the positivistic
or realist slant of much contemporary legal thought. Transplants bring
into contact bodies of law which are based on different assumptions, if
not even on different ontologies.53 This by itself casts doubt on the absolute
validity of the normative systems that come into contact. To look to different
laws with curiosity is to learn that the path of the law is not to be thought in
the singular, but in the plural. This outlook undermines any abstract notion
of justice and the very idea that the boundaries of community are also the
boundaries of justice.54 The growth of judicial review across the globe after
World War II is an example of this kind of transplant and a major one at that,
53 FIGURED WORLDS: ONTOLOGICAL OBSTACLES IN INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS
(Joseph Clammer et al. eds., 2004).
54 KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS
(2007).
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as Morton Horwitz notes in his contribution to this volume on constitutional
transplants.55
Legal transplants involving violence and coercion of all kinds cannot be
put in the same box with peaceful transplants, however. Under tragic
circumstances, justice becomes a burning issue for everyone. When
transplants are carried out in tragic contexts they expose the brutal effects
that the exercise of power has on the lives of those who live under the
transplanted law and raise more urgent questions about what the law is.
To be sure, international law today is regularly called upon to meet the
challenge to justice posed by aggressions and outbursts of violence across
the globe. Its origins lie in the rejection of the old idea that the law has little
to say in the presence of unequal power relations.56 It is beyond the scope
of this Article to examine what international law has achieved in this respect,
either through the discourse of human rights, or otherwise. The bottom-up
perspective adopted here requires us instead to consider once more the level
at which individuals who are involved in transplants imposed by violence
take action and react to it. At this level, the dynamic that leads to a betrayal
of justice is regularly unleashed by attacks on the moral status of the targets
of violence and coercion. This strategy works to build estrangement and put
distance between the perpetrators and their victims. The undoing of sentiments
of empathy that support pacific coexistence thus destroys the fundaments of
the common ground for equal treatment that are rooted in our innate ability to
understand the intentions and emotions of others.57
In his engaging contribution to the conference upon which this issue
is based, on the foreign sources of the Israeli Absentee Property Act
of 1950,58 Alexandre Kedar rightly notes that ethnocratic legislatures often
devise systems of differentiation and construct legal categories that facilitate
the application of discriminatory rules, but without openly admitting that they
are resorting to discriminatory treatment. This choice is an attempt to contain
55 Morton Horwitz, Constitutional Transplants, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 535
(2009).
56 Cf. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR bk. V, ch. 17, at 85-113
(Charles Forster Smith trans., 1921) (the Melian dialogue).
57 For scientific evidence on these innate capabilities: Maddalena Fabbri-Destro &
Giacomo Rizzolatti, Mirror Neurons and Mirror Systems in Monkeys and Humans,
23 PHYSIOLOGY 171 (2008).
58 Alexandre Kedar, The British, Indian and Pakistani Sources of the Israeli Absentee
Property Act of 1950 (June 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, delivered at the
Cegla Center conference on Histories of Legal Transplantations, on file with author).
See also Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, On the Legal Geography of Ethnocratic Settler
States: Notes Towards a Research Agenda, 5 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 401 (2003).
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the loss of reputation caused by the loss of the moral high ground, which is a
consequence of such an oblique move. But the subterfuge holds up a mirror
to the authors of this opaque strategy. It reveals the fear of reciprocation that
motivates it. That sign of weakness, I contend, is the starting point for any
further reasoning on issues of justice in similar contexts. That sentiment is
an implicit admission that all the parties involved in the conflict — no matter
how different their habits and opinions may be — share a common precarious
condition as individuals, which raises problems that the formation of modern
states has not resolved. We have to go back to the intuition of that common
condition to understand why the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, just
like so many other human rights instruments, is best understood not as an act
of self-confidence adopted to celebrate moral progress, but as a narrow escape
route from the tragic future prepared by the catastrophic past unleashed by the
limitations of the Hobbesian paradigm of state sovereignty. This document,
like other documents of its kind, is a testimony to the necessity to come to
terms with that past in the arena of law, justice, and public discourse. We
should be open to the recognition that the chances of an eventual redemption
are slim if we do not attend to this need.

